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Normative regionalism in East Asia 
Baogang He 
Normative regionalism has been largely overlooked and ignored; and 
normative questions concerning regionalization are deemed unimportant, 
idealist and irrelevant to Asia. This is mainly due to the domination of 
realism, pragmatism and functional approaches, thus inhibiting the sub-
stantial progress of regionalism in East Asia. It is time that scholars and 
policy-makers take normative orders of regionalism seriously. 
This chapter examines the state of normative regionalism and its im-
pact in East Asia through an overview of the historical evolution of the 
concept of regionalism, the meanings of and variations in Asian regional-
ism, and the impact of all these on regional cooperation in East Asia. 
It examines the old pan-Asianism, the advocacy of "re-Asianization" in 
Japan, Mahathir's idea of neo-Asianism in Malaysia and the ideas of 
regionalism developed in Korea and China. This examination provides the 
basis for a discussion of the normative order of East Asian regionalism 
by addressing a set of questions concerning national sovereignty, nation-
alism, democracy and regional identities. 
In particular, this chapter will examine how Asian nationalist and sta-
tist normative thinking influences various ideas of regionalism and con-
strains the development of genuine regionalism in East Asia. 
Normative regionalism 
Four approaches to regionalism have been summarized in the preceding 
chapter (see Higgott and Timmermann in this volume). 
Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional steps towards global governance, Timmermann 
and Tsuchiyama (eds), United Nations University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-92-808-1156-8 
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• De facto regionalism is concerned with informal, market-led economic 
integration and takes a rationalist-economic analytical orientation . 
• De jure regionalism is about formal, rule-governed, state-led institu-
tional cooperation, and takes a legal-political analytical orientation. 
• Instrumental regionalism focuses on identifying the interest to be 
gained by the development of a common policy towards third parties 
in a given topic area . 
• Cognitive regionalism builds on shared cultural, historical and emo-
tional affiliations that distinguish "insiders" from "outsiders". 
While these four stances are comprehensive enough to cover almost all 
approaches to regionalism, there is still room to add another substantial 
approach: namely, normative regionalism that focuses on shared values 
and provides conflict-resolution mechanisms. Normative regionalism is 
extremely important, for four reasons. 
First, any regionalization involves substantial changes in normative 
thinking and behaviour (particularly in adjusting national norms and es-
tablishing regional identities and values). If regionalization is possible in 
East Asia, the development of regional norms and values is an essential 
precondi tion. 
Second, normative regionalism has constructive roles to play in guiding 
directions, providing visions and setting up the principles of organizing 
and creating a regional community. 
Third, normative regionalism is required because of the insufficiency 
and inadequacy of instrumental or functional regionalism. Economic 
trade and cooperation have been an engine of Asian regionalism. Func-
tional regionalism, however, is limited to a few selected areas and is 
based on the calculation of economic interests. It is unstable and has an 
inherent limitation in developing effective and good governance on a re-
gional basis. Shared values are essential for solid normative regionalism. 
A fourth reason for normative regionalism is the challenge of the EU 
normative model for East Asia. Do the European practice of regionalism 
and its normative assumptions provide a successful model for East Asia? 
Is the application of EU standards appropriate for East Asia? 
The state of normative regionalism and its impact in East Asia will be 
analysed through an examination of Asian ideas of regionalism and their 
associated normative assumptions. 
Japan's ideas of Asianism 
As early as 1916, Odera Kenkichi (1878-1949) elaborated the idea of 
Greater Asianism as a tool of racial unity to confront the White Peril. 1 
Pan-Asianism held the view that East Asians are of the same yellow 
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race, in opposition to the white race, and that Japanese, Chinese and 
Koreans should unify to establish a new order and an East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Rin Kaito, a publicist, called for a spirit of Japanese 
pan-Asianism: "For over a century-and-a-half, the Asiatics have been 
pressed down by the Whites and subjected to Western tyranny. But 
Japan, after defeating Russia, has aroused the sleeping Asiatics to shake 
off the Western tyranny and torture."z 
The idea became increasingly popular. Major-General Kenji Doihara, 
who had the reputation of being one of Japan's most astute military dip-
lomats and experts on the Asian mainland, was an avowed advocate of 
pan-Asianism. The doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics", according to Doi-
hara in an issue of Dai Asia Shugi (a magazine devoted to expounding 
pan-Asian ideas), "is based on the supreme principle that Asia must be 
safe-guarded and maintained by Asiatics".3 In other words, the Occiden-
tals should go - from China, first of all, and then from the Dutch East 
Indies, the Philippines, India and other parts of Asia. Under the condi-
tions at that time, however, "Asia for the Asiatics" was in practice synony-
mous with "Japan over Asia", or Japanese supremacy in Asia through 
the withdrawal of the influence of the West. 4 
General Iwane Matsui also described "an Asiatic League of Nations" 
as one of the ideals of his organization. He declared that pan-Asianism 
had won followers in China, India, French Indo-China, the Philippines 
and Afghanistan. 5 On 3 November 1938 Japanese Prime Minister 
Konoye Fumimaro proclaimed a New Order in East Asia, and on 1 August 
1940 Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke made public the con-
cept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. . 
If pan-Asianism took the form of religious spirit and non-violence in 
India, it assumed a military and violent form in Japan. This difference 
was reflected in the different understandings of "spirit", which the J apa-
nese usually thought of as bushido, or the martial ethos of the samurai 
warrior class that had dominated Japanese society until its class privileges 
were abolished in the late nineteenth century. The businessman Kuni-
hiko Okura, for example, defines the "national spirit" as complete loy-
alty to the state and all its activities: "The Japanese Spirit consists in 
realizing the glory of being a subject of the Emperor. ,,6 
Military pan-Asianism contributed to Japan's drive for expansion. Jap-
anese pan-Asianism justified the war against Korea and China by sug-
gesting that the objective was to safeguard the "Japanese spirit that we 
have cultivated for thousands of years" against the threat of communism. 
For Okura, it was the war of "Asia" with "each person of the country 
doing his own bit for the realization of idealism" and, as a result of the 
war, the Japanese had grown "spiritually strong and true".7 
Re-evaluation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere began 
in the early 1950s, and continued through the 1960s and into the 1990s. 
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Kobori Keiichi, a professor at Tokyo University, believed that there 
would come a time to return to the idea of pan-Asianism. Former Japa-
nese Prime Minister Takeshita expressed his affirmative view of the 
Greater East Asia War. Although the idea of pan-Asianism is not likely 
to have much impact on Japanese policy, the idea lies beneath the surface 
of popular consciousness like an unexploded bomb. 8 An increasing num-
ber of Japanese scholars have identified a "re-Asianization" of both 
Japan and the region. Increasingly it is argued that a shared set of values, 
which include respect for personal relationships, cooperation, balance, 
harmony and non-contentious consensus building, signify an emerging 
sense of pan-Asianess. 
The economic dynamism of the Pacific-Asian region and the end of the 
Cold War facilitated a search for a new conception of regionalism. The 
"new Asianism" was promoted mostly by economic rather than geopolit-
ical elites. Kobayashi Yotaro, the president of Fuji Xerox, encouraged 
his country to undergo "re-Asianization".9 Japan's Economic Planning 
Agency identified Japan, the NIEs and ASEAN as potential forces to 
form one organic unit, and called for the formation of a regional organi-
zation. 10 Under the Hashimoto cabinet, the ASEAN-Japan Multina-
tional Cultural Mission was established to create a contemporary Asian 
culture. 11 Toshio Watanabe, an economist at the Tokyo Institute of 
Technology, points mit that "Japan's new nationalism is real, and it is in-
timately linked with Asianism".12 
This new Asianism has cultural normative implications and represents 
Asian culture as a counterpoint to Western culture. Shintaro Ishihara, a 
Japanese parliament member between 1968 and 1995 and author of The 
Japan That Can Say No, asserts: 
The end of East-West ideological conflict has finally enabled Japan to start to 
disengage from the West. Given the historical forces at work, our sojourn was 
unavoidable, but now we must free ourselves from delusions fostered by the 
Cold War. We can begin with self-awareness. Under the Japan-US mutual se-
curity treaty, the Self-Defense Forces are a bc;tttalion on call to the Pentagon. 
Japanese are Asians related to this region by blood and culture, and Japan is 
an Asian country. 13 . 
In December 1990 the Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir, 
in his first proposal for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), which 
subsequently became the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEe), gave 
Japan the prominent role of being the "voice of Asia" in the G7 meet-
ings.14 Such a role would enhance Japan's international position and con-
tribute to its independence from the United States. 
Japan has been ambivalent about the EAEC. It was constrained by 
US policy and did not have full autonomy on regional issues. Since the 
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United States rejected the EAEC and supported APEC, Japanese Prime 
Ministers Miyazawa, Hosokawa, Hata and Murayama have placed the 
highest priority on multilateral forums that included the United States 
and promoted "open regionalism". In February 2002 Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed an open regional partnership with 
Southeast Asia, China, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, there-
by making ASEAN+5 practically no different from APEC. 
Malaysian ideas of regionalism 
Malaysia initiated the Association of Southeast Asia in 1959, and Maphi-
lindo (Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia) in 1963. Although both organi-
zations disintegrated, they were illustrative of Malaysia's attempts at 
regional coalition building. At present, Malaysia participates in two 
major regional organizations: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
The ARF provides an important security forum for Malaysia. It illus-
trates the fact that "the states of East Asia are viewing their security in-
creasingly in regional, rather than global, terms, as the region becomes 
ever more distinct as a differentiated security complex". 15 
Mahathir's proposal of the EAEC in 1990 was the boldest and most as-
sertive attempt to build an exclusive Asian regional bloc. It provided an 
"Asian-only" alternative to APEC: Malaysia criticizes APEC as being 
too large to be effective and dominated by Australia and the United 
States. 
The EAEC was also designed to act as a counterweight to the power-
ful, competing organizations of NAFTA and the European Union. Maha-
thir said, "We think the EAEC will prevent domination of world trade by 
anyone bloc, enhance East Asian prosperity, and contribute to regional 
stability and peace.,,16 He stressed Asia's own regionalism, indepen-
dence and dignity. His proposal was a significant indication that some 
Asian countries increasingly wish to be seen as a single, coherent re-
gion. 17 
His version of Asianism implicitly or explicitly adopts the doctrine of 
defending traditional culture and resisting the penetration of Western 
culture, and had a strong anti-US element. It even implied that Australia, 
if it wanted to be a part of Asia, must not follow the policies of the 
United States. 18 
Mahathir's proposal deliberately excluded the United States, which 
supports APEC. In turn, the United States has marginalized the EAEe 
project and prevented an East Asian economic "bloc" from emerg-
ing. The proposal thus not only overlooked the overlapping patterns of 
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economic development in the late twentieth century, but also the reluc-
tance of East Asian states to exclude important trading partners such 
as the United States from regional organizations. Moreover, East Asian 
security relies heavily on the United States; China and Japan have felt 
more comfortable with Western countries than with each other; and 
Southeast Asian countries are worried about Japan-led regionalism. 
On the whole, the EAEC has not developed into an institution, and 
has not gained the approval of as many countries as Mahathir wished. 
Nevertheless, its putative membership has emerged as "ASEAN Plus 
Three" (China, Japan and the ROK) and it has reinforced regional coun-
tries' affinity with, and commitment to, the concept of East Asia - albeit 
without creating a political and ideological identity. 19 
Korean ideas of regionalism 
In line with Mahathir's position, Koo Jong-suh proposes a Korean ver-
sion of pan-Asianism for the primacy of East Asia. He argues that the 
current unipolar system, with the United States at its apex, will be re-
placed by a multipolar system wherein East Asia, Western Europe and 
North America will share international hegemony. He even imagines 
that a global order could be dominated by East Asia at the end of the 
twenty-first century. For such a grand agenda, Koo suggests that a pan-
Asianist movement should take a fresh approach, with Korea's mission 
being to build a Northeast Asian community of cooperation. 20 
Ahn Byung-joon from Yonsei ,University does not favour Malaysia's 
re-Asianization approach. He argues that "re-Asianizatiori" actually 
means "de-Westernizing" Asia, or "de-Americanization", and that South 
Korea has supported the Pacific view of open regionalism as a counter-
balance to the more conservative assertions of Asianism. Ahn suggests 
that the United States, Japan, China and other actors should share lead-
ership in facilitating regional cooperation, with Japan taking a leadership 
role in economic regionalism and the United States taking a lead in secu-
ri ty regionalism. 21 
Rhee Sang-woo from Sogang University discourages the competition 
between ~hina and Japan for hegemony in East Asia, and welcomes the 
formation of a new Asian community based on cooperation. In his con-
ception~-of a new order for an East Asian Community, he suggests that 
China and Japan should build an economic community through integrat-
ing their economies, developing a joint security system, promoting cul-
tural exchange and developing a new East Asian culture. 22 
In pursuing EU-style economic integration, Chang-Jae Lee, director of 
the Center for Regional Economic Studies at the Korea Institute for 
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International Economic Policy (KIEP), suggests that the Korean govern-
ment should propose the formation of a Council for Northeast Asian 
Economic Cooperation to discuss economic cooperation and major eco-
nomic issues among China, Japan and South Korea. 23 In Singapore, on 
27 November 2000, President Kim Dae-jung proposed that the current 
ASEAN+3 be transformed into an East Asian Summit that would even-
tually develop into an economic community, leading to Northeast Asian 
economic regionalism. 24 
Churl-Jin Suk proposes that China, Japan and South Korea should im-
itate the European integration model to overcome their unpleasant his-
tory by establishing a prospective East Asian Community. He suggests 
that these three countries should establish regional goals based on com-
mon ideas and develop a sense of community in East Asia through cul-
tural exchange among the younger generation and knowledge-based 
information exchange. Additionally, he says that East Asia should de-
velop regional security cooperation, like NATO, to implement common 
foreign and security policy.25 
Chinese ideas of regionalism 
Mahathir tabled his EAEG proposal during a meeting with the then 
Chinese Premier, Li Peng, in 1991. In the face of Chinese opposition, 
the idea of including Chinese Taipei was dropped. 26 Although Chinese 
leaders such as Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin supported the 
EAEG,27 China, which has fobalance its relationship with the United 
States, did not endorse Mahathir's exclusive regionalism against the 
United States. 
China has been reluctant to accept Asian multilateralism. It was not 
a founding member of APEC, and it initially opposed the concept of a 
"Pacific Community". China was also reluctant to engage in multilateral 
security dialogue such as through the ARF. For China, however, the po-
litical costs of non-participation in the ARF are large: "China will find it 
far more difficult to spurn US initiatives to define a set of 'rules of accept-
able behaviour' if these rules are institutionalized through the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.,,28 Although its position on the ARF has warmed up, 
China still wants the forum to remain a consultative body rather than 
for it to develop as a mechanism for conflict resolution. 
Regionalism, however, is a recent phenomenon in China. It does not 
have a larger view of regional development and cooperation. Chinese 
intellectuals seldom talk about great visions of regionalism or, if they 
do, they tend to criticize pan-Asianism or neo-Asianism.29 Instead, they 
more often speak of "Greater China".30 
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Unlike the middle powers of Malaysia and South Korea, China's status 
as a big country and big power in Asia reduces its incentive to establish 
regionalism for its survival and influence. The domination of Chinese 
nationalist discourse gives little room for genuine regionalism; rather, 
regionalism is used as a tool to build the Chinese nation-state. Chinese 
nationalist grievances about historical humiliations make it difficult to ac-
cept multilateral cooperation with Japan. 31 The self-perceived centrality 
of China in its long history creates a psychological barrier for the Beijing 
leadership to get out of a China-centric framework to embrace regional-
ism and grasp and meet any peripheral challenges. 32 China's tribute sys-
tem consisted of a series of bilateral relations, thus it lacks experience 
of multilateral diplomacy. Confucian diplomacy tended to take interna-
tional relations as interpersonal rather than inter-state. 33 All these fac-
tors have hindered China's role in developing regionalism. 
Nevertheless, Chinese cultural attitudes and values are changing. Pro-
fessor Zhang Xizhen of Beijing University has argued that China should 
support Japan in playing a leading role, and that Japan and China should 
be the core nations in building East Asian regionalism. They can check 
and balance each other, and prevent the formation of hegemony in the 
region. Equally Professor Liang Yunxiang, also of Beijing University, 
suggests that China and Japan could find common interest with the con-
struction of Japan- and China-led East Asian regionalism. 34 
Normative order of Asian regionalism 
Diversities _and differences still overshadow the development of an East 
Asian regional identity. East Asians may agree on peace, coexistence, 
prosperity and progress, but they disagree, for instance, on human rights 
and democracy. The above discussions of Asian ideas reflect a normative 
order of East Asian regionalism with several features: democracy is not a 
normative value for regional organizations; national sovereignty should 
not be sacrificed for a regional order; and Asian regionalism is a process 
of an elite-led, market-driven and ideologically biased movement against 
the West. 
These Asian normative ideas have informed and affected regionaliza-
tion in East Asia, as illustrated by the developments in Asian inter-
governmental forums like the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the ARF, 
and informal networks between non-governmental organizations. Such 
forums have increasingly assumed and promoted shared economic, polit-
ical, social and cultural agendas. But are there any prospects for a norma-
tive development towards the acceptance of pooling sovereignty, as seen 
in the case of Europe? 
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pooling of sovereignty and unanimity 
In the maturation process of the European Union, nation-states have 
pooled their sovereignty in certain areas to form a great union. Such 
sacrifice of national sovereignty is a new normative order for the greater 
unification of the EU member countries. 
The development of East Asian regionalism reveals a completely dif-
ferent order. Rather then pooling sovereignty, national sovereignty has 
been strengthened in the process. From the beginning, East Asian re-
gionalism has been based on respect for and consolidation of national 
sovereignty. The mutual recognition of national sovereignty and the 
statist emphasis on the principle of non-intervention have been pre-
requisites for joining ASEAN, as evidenced by the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (1976). 
In the early stage of development of East Asian regionalism, the con-
solidation of national sovereignty was an attractive incentive to encour-
age national leaders to support and push regionalism. Any early attempt 
to sacrifice national sovereignty would have caused panic among these 
leaders and invited resistance to regional integration. The pooling of s9v-
ereignty would therefore be an option only at a much later stage. 
Whereas the European Community inspired the leaders of Southeast 
Asia to emulate European integration in the 1950s through to the 1970s, 
in the 1980s Southeast Asian leaders realized that the concept of Euro-
pean integration meant a partial transfer of sovereignty and a strong 
institutional framework. They stressed that ASEAN never intended to 
follow the example of European integration. 35 
Their colonial past has made East Asian states sensitive to relinquish-
ing any degree of national sovereignty, and, given their current weak po-
sition in world politics, sovereignty is seen as necessary to prevent foreign 
powers from intervening in their domestic affairs. In this historical and 
political context, most leaders in East Asia are reluctant to initiate or ac-
cept regional cooperation. 
Asian consensus (or unanimous decision-making) has been another 
main principle in Asian regional cooperation. Unanimity guarantees that 
a nation-state could block regional decisions in safeguarding its~sover­
eignty and defending its political fate, but such a process of decision-
making is slow and consensus almost impossible to achieve. 
This strong commitment to national sovereignty and the rule of un-
animity has prevented ASEAN, for example, from developing an effec-
tive regional response to regional environmental problems,36 the Asian 
economic crisis and the East Timor crisis. Realizing that the rule of un-
animity no longer works; the notion o( "flexible consensus" and the idea 
of "concerted unilateralism" were proposed. 37 
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Nationalism: Driving force for East Asian regionalism 
The development of Asian regionalism did not begin with reducing na-
tional sovereignty, but with supporting it. 
East Asian regionalism, moreover, needs to be understood in the con-
text of nationalism. In fact, the key to understanding Asian regionalism 
lies in nation-states. The core element of Asian regionalism is the central-
ity of the nation-state. While regionalism is an application instrumental 
to nation building, nationalism is always of the essence. Asian nation-
states are the driving forces for regional development, as in the case of 
the competition between Japan and China which led to the rapid devel-
opment of a regional free trade proposal, agreement and implementation 
from March 2001. East Asian countries support regionalism for national 
interests and issues of state power. Asian regionalism never significantly 
challenges the nation-state system. Respecting and strengthening na-
tional identity will be the key to the success of any project of regionalism. 
Gilbert Rozman, who examines flawed strategies of regionalism in 
Northeast Asia, strongly argues that nationalism stands in the way of 
East Asian regionalism. 38 Indeed, nationalism seems to be fundamen-
tally antithetical to the creation of a regional polity and has little sympa-
thy for regional identities. It can therefore be regarded as a significant 
obstacle to the promotion of genuine regionalism. 
An East Asian, however, might hold a different view, and might make 
a distinction between several types of nationalism. While an inward-
looking, narrow and irrational nationalism is dangerous and constitutes 
an obstacle to regionalism, an outward-looking, rational and legitimate 
nationalism is concerned with national status and interest. Such a consid-
eration, taken seriously by nationalists, is the norm in the practice of East 
Asian regionalism and constitutes a positive force for regionalism. This 
kind of nationalism is perfectly compatible with East Asian regionalism 
because such regionalism clearly demonstrates a different normative 
logic of development. 
Consequently, East Asian regionalism is a process of intergovernmen-
tal collaboration on a geographically limited basis. It involves no more 
than regional material exchange, free trade agreements and a security 
dialogue among countries, with no intellectual or political commitment 
to a greater union. 
Mahathir, for instance, proposed the EAEC idea in order to promote 
Malay nationalism. He played an assertive role in voicing Malaysian 
views in the international arena and successfully raised the country's in-
ternational profile. 39 
Malaysia as a "middle power" has to build up partnerships with its 
neighbours of similar size in order to increase its influence. The growing 
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regional consciousness and continued enmity between the region's great 
powers suggest the construction of a multilateral regional political associ-
ation centred on the small and medium powers, and drawing the great 
powers into a framework of voluntary restraint. The aim is to increase 
the voice of small and middle states in international affairs. Regionalism 
gives the smaller countries or middle-power states a say in the nature of 
the regional arrangement and its strategic organization. 
Another example is China's attempt to constrain Chinese Taipei 
through regional organizations. Beijing's proposed FT A between China 
and ASEAN excluded Chinese Taipei (by contrast, Chinese Taipei is a 
member of APEC). Economically, Chinese Taipei is an indispensable 
member of an East Asia Free Trade Agreement.4o 
The question of Chinese Taipei, however, poses a significant challenge 
to East Asian regionalism. Chinese Taipei demands regional membership 
in its own right, but Beijing sees it only as being a part of China. If na-
tionalism seems to be compatible with regionalism in Southeast Asia, it 
certainly contradicts regionalism in Northeast Asia, as evidenced by the 
Chinese Taipei membership question. 
Democracy and regionalism 
The European Union has required democracy as a necessary precondi-
tion for its members. Thus, EU expansion has been a process of spread-
ing democracy in Europe. The entry of Turkey into the European Union 
has been delayed largely due to its regime system (and, to some de-
gree, its Islamic culture). Western commentators have consequently 
suggested that the expansion of ASEAN should take a democracy re-
quirement seriously. ASEAN, however, against heavy criticism, admitted 
a military-dominated Myanmar as its newest member in 1997 and fos-
tered regional relations with the authoritarian state of China. 
Asian pragmatism thereby won out over normative requirements in 
order to push East Asian regionalism. Mainland China, North Korea, 
Viet Nam and Myanmar have not been democratized, Singapore, Malay-
sia and Cambodia have only an electoral form of democracy. This uneven 
political development has ruled out a democracy requirement for East 
Asian regionalism. One also needs to bear in mind that East Asian de-
mocratization only started in the Philippines, South Korea and Chinese 
Taipei in the 1980s, and in Indonesia in the 1990s, while most EU states 
have been democratized for decades. 
In addition, historical legacies can play a more important role in the 
development of regional cooperation t~an the nature of the political re-
gime. Japan and South Korea are both democracies, but their conflict 
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over the history textbook issue has substantially inhibited the develop-
ment of regionalism in Northeast Asia (see Berger in this volume). 
Nevertheless, East Asian regionalism has incorporated the idea of de-
mocracy in recent years. The year 2005 was a watershed in the history of 
East Asian regionalism. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of the ASEAN Charter embodied the first written requirement 
for the promotion of democracy and human rights, and obligations for 
transparency, good governance and strengthening democratic institu-
tions. It was signed at the Thirteenth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 
November 2007. 
The ASEAN way is strikingly state-centric, but the statist norm has 
increasingly been challenged by networks of non-governmental organiza-
tions that have advocated the principle of "people-hood", or a people-
centric approach to regionalism. In order to build a people-centric order, 
civil society groups demand more funding from, and representation in, 
various regional governmental bodies. For example, it was argued that 
non-governmental organizations should be accredited or granted ob-
server status at the East Asian Community Summit. Regional coopera-
tion among civil society groups within Asia complements regionalism at 
the non-governmental level, and there is a need to develop closer coop-
eration between NGOs and governments.41 
In response to mainland China's blockage politics, several democracy-
centric organizations (reaching beyond East Asia) have been established 
under the sponsorship of Taiwan, which has been excluded from some re-
gionalorganizations. 
The Democratic Pacific Union was established in 2004 and aims to 
safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law; ensure the 
peaceful resolution of regional disputes and the protection of human 
security; and promote maritime culture and sustainable development in 
the Pacific region.42 The World Forum on Democratization in Asia was 
founded in 2005, with the objective of pledging solidarity and support 
for Asian democracy activists struggling against autocratic forces in the 
region. 43 In addition, the Initiative and Referendum Institute Asia 
(2006) and the Global Forum on New Democracies (2007) were sup-
ported by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy to advance constitu-
tional reform and promote new democracies. 
Asian culture is problematic for Asian regionalism 
Shared cultural heritages have facilitated the formation of the European 
Union. But is a common regional cultural identity indispensable for a re-
gional group? 
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Mahathir's proposal assumed a common regional identity and culture 
to justify the formation of the EAEC. The emphasis on cultural homoge-
neity limits membership, resulting in a greater role for regional actors. By 
restricting membership in this way, power can be concentrated within the 
region while avoiding Western influence and dominance. Mahathir tried 
to argue that regional cultural identity is the basis for Asian regionalism. 
Yet Mahathir's cultural identity argument cannot hold. Anti-West sen-
timent is the pitfall of Asian regionalism. The idea of opposition between 
West and East is unworkable because of the penetration of Western in-
tluence,44 the domination of the United States and the overlapping of 
communities. Asia has undergone a process of Westernization and/or 
modernization; Marxism and liberalism are mixed with Islam, Confucian-
ism, Daoism and other traditional beliefs. Around 30 per cent of the 
South Korean population, for example, are Christian. Singapore is best de-
scribed as an immigrant and commercial society, or a legalist-controlled 
and Chinese-dominated community where Western capitalism, the rule 
of law and diverse cultures coexist. Asian culture as a mechanism for 
regional identity does not constitute a strong basis for regionalism. As 
Anwar points out, "Asia has not a settled identity at present. It is in the 
process of coming into being."45 
Take, for example, the proposal that China and Japan be treated as 
part of the same civilization, with common features such as a Confucian 
value system and the same written characters, and that this commonality 
could provide a foundation for regionalism. This is not a viable proposal, 
however. Some Japanese nationalists emphasize the uniqueness of Japan, 
while Chinese nationalists take little interest in any such regional iden-
tity. In addition, mainstream opinion in China harbours strong resent-
ment against Japan. 46 In fact, it was the competition between Japan and 
China that ASEAN countries were able to draw on as an incentive to 
speed up regional cooperation. The fact that Japan and China competed 
with each other to push for a free trade agreement with ASEAN is evi-
dence of this. 
Although the diversity in Asian cultures is problematic for providing 
common ground for a single regional identity, the cultures do play impor-
tant roles in building East Asian regionalism. First, they tend to prevent 
Australia from participating in East Asian regionalism, simply because 
Australia is not regarded as being a part of Asian culture. Second, di-
verse Asian traditions playa part in the construction of regional orders. 
Japan has taken a leading role in developing a great vision of Asian 
regionalism, and this has been associated with -its tradition of pan-
Asianism. China's conception of regional order is a remnant of a post-
tribute system in which China attempt~ to pacify neighbouring countries 
through a trade surplus with China. And the historic rivalry between 
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Japan and China has continued to play various roles with regard to the 
development of regionalism. East Asian regional order has been, and 
will continue to be, rooted in its history and culture. 
Certainly, Asian conceptions of regionalism are constrained by geo-
politics, and by historic and economic factors. What underlies Asian per-
ceptions of regionalism is the awareness of a dominant US power in 
Asia. The unipolar system, under which US power is felt in East Asia 
and maintains the fragmentation and division of East Asia, has made it 
difficult (if not impossible) for a common Asian identity to emerge. 
Washington has defined the basic norm of East Asian regionalism: that 
such regionalism should be open, inclusive and transparent. This is de-
signed to preserve American domination in the region, and explains why 
the United States supported APEC but rejected the EAEC. 
Washington promotes Asia-Pacific regionalism that centres on the Pa-
cific Ocean. It is an open regionalism associated with the values of human 
rights, democracy, individualism and free trade. The governments of the 
United States, Australia, Japan and South Korea support this concept. 
The competing normative regional order is based on pan-Asianism and 
is centred on the Asian continent. It is a closed regionalism, restricted 
to Asians themselves and associated with Asian values and cultures. 
Malaysia, some sections of the Japanese business elite and some Korean 
scholars support this kind of regionalism. These two competing orders 
are divergent and in conflict, and they create different expectations and 
visions of how the East Asian region should evolve. 
In this context, there are enormous challenges to normative rethinking 
of Washington's leadership. The arrogance of the position that East 
Asian regionalism achieves nothing if it lacks American endorsement 
and support is unproductive, and the argument that Asian regionalism 
should not alter or undermine the bilateral agreement between the 
United States and South Korea (or Japan) is problematic and unhelpful. 
The traditional divide-and-rule strategy does not help to promote a cohe-
sive regionalism in Asia. It is time for Washington to accept that certain 
forms of strong and stable Asian regionalism are in the greater interest of 
the United States. The policy-makers in Washington will regret in the 
future if the United States inhibits or destroys East Asian regionalism. 
At the same time, the recent development of East Asian regionalism 
demonstrates the increasing influence of China's regional power and the 
slow erosion of US power, as evidenced by the exclusion of the United 
States from ASEAN+3, the Asia-Europe Summit, the SCO and the 
GMS summit, and by the decline in the importance of APEC. The grad-
ually declining American influence on various regional organizations and 
summits, the increasing critique of the application of the EU model in 
East Asia and the increasing self-confidence of East Asian countries -
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plus the rise of China's power - will dictate the future of East Asian 
regionalism. 
Conclusion 
East Asian regional development has been measured against the bench-
mark of the European Union, which for a long while has offered inspira-
tion, hope and standards. But an examination of different normative 
orders of regionalism in East Asia and the European Union reveals that 
simply borrowing the ideal order of the European Union is superficial. 
European regionalism and East Asian regionalism have several different 
normative elements and tensions. The normative foundations of the Eu-
ropean Union are democracy, human rights, individual liberty, the reduc-
tion of national sovereignty and the rise of regional organizations that 
are able to override national governments. The normative foundation of 
Asian regionalism is a nationalist doctrine with a clear and unvanishing 
focus on sovereignty, statist power and Asian culture or values. 
The Asian pragmatic and functional approach is problematic, and es-
pecially inadequate to deal with international normative challenges. One 
thing is certain, however: the Asian normative order of regionalism will 
strengthen national sovereignty through the strategic use of nationalist 
ethos and forces. At the same time, East Asian states will need to be flex-
ible enough to surrender a portion of their sovereignty to regional organ-
izations in order to make regionalism effective. So far, the East Asian 
preoccupation with (and overcommitment to) national sovereignty and 
the approach of unanimous voting make it impossible to develop a pow-
erful regional organization to tackle intra-regional common issues. It is 
time for East Asians to go beyond existing intellectual constraints and 
search for an appropriate order that is suitable for the region. 
The question of how to strike a healthy balance between the under-
standable desire for national sovereignty and the needed willingness to 
give up some sovereign powers in order to respond better to global and 
regional challenges will be a thorny one for East Asia. 
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